Ethiopia's Propaganda Outfit Horn Review’s Fantasy: No, Eritrea’s Sovereignty Is Not Reversible • Mesob Journal

When "Think Tanks" Drift Into Fantasy

It is often said that politics in the Horn of Africa suffers from a chronic shortage of clear-eyed realism and an overabundance of wishful thinking. Few recent publications capture this affliction as vividly as a September 30 essay by Horn Review, boldly titled “Eritrea Unraveled: The Case for Ethiopia’s Reversal of State Recognition.”

The title alone reads like a provocation. The content? Something between a legal parody, a history re-write, and a policy recommendation masquerading as intellectual seriousness. The essay insists that Eritrea’s independence was a discretionary act of Ethiopian generosity in 1993, a “Mother State’s permission,” and therefore subject to revocation — as if Eritrea’s sovereignty were a Netflix subscription Addis Ababa could cancel when dissatisfied.

Amusing? Yes. Dangerous? Also yes.

Because behind the tortured analogies and borrowed international law jargon lies a familiar and troubling theme: Ethiopia’s elite obsession with the Red Sea and its refusal, even three decades later, to accept Eritrea’s independence as a fact of history and a right exercised by its people. This piece demands a response — not merely to defend Eritrea’s record, but to expose the intellectual shortcuts and political motivations behind Horn Review’s argument.

What Exactly Is PP's Horn Review?

Before addressing their claims, context matters.

Horn Review styles itself as a think tank and research platform, launched in 2021 in Addis Ababa. It describes its mission as “connecting ideas and synergies” across the Horn of Africa. Noble words. Yet scratch beneath the surface and one finds a young outfit without transparent funding disclosures, thin institutional record and a clear alignment with the Prosperity Party and Abiy Ahmed’s shifting domestic agendas.

Its board and leadership include figures like Getachew Nigatu (founder) and Blen Mamo (executive director). The editorial content is overwhelmingly Ethiopia-centric, often reflecting the ideological preoccupations of the Prosperity Party (PP) elite and segments of the Addis intellectual class. While disclaimers say its essays do not necessarily represent Horn Review’s views, the platform operates as a forum for Ethiopian PP nationalist narratives dressed in the language of policy analysis.

This latest article is a case in point. Far from detached scholarship, it is a political intervention — a pseudo-legal blueprint designed to validate Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions and rationalize maximalist policies.

The Myth of Ethiopia’s Gift

At the heart of Horn Review’s argument is a breathtakingly arrogant claim: that Ethiopia granted Eritrea recognition in 1993 as a magnanimous gesture, “extending the hand of legitimacy.” In other words, Eritrea’s statehood is framed as a gift Ethiopia can reconsider.

This is historical fiction.

Eritrea did not get independence from Ethiopia. It fought for it — for thirty years, against Haile Selassie’s empire, against the Soviet-backed Derg, against staggering odds, through sacrifice and strategic brilliance unmatched in Africa.

President Isaias Afwerki himself put this to rest in a 1991 lecture at Princeton University. When asked about Eritrea’s independence, he replied bluntly:

“Number one — Eritrea did not get its independence from Ethiopia at all. We had our just cause; we fought for a long time, almost three decades, half a century. And when 1991 came we postponed the unilateral declaration of independence in order to go through a legitimate political process… We were not asking for the blessing of the Ethiopian government or anybody else for that matter. No one was invited to offer Eritrea independence on a silver platter. Not at all — we rejected that all the way.”

In 1993, Eritreans themselves went to the polls in a UN-supervised referendum. The outcome was unequivocal: 99.8 percent voted for independence. That was the moment of statehood. Not an act of charity from Addis Ababa, but the free, fair, internationally witnessed will of the Eritrean people.

To suggest otherwise is not simply revisionist — it insults the memory of tens of thousands of Eritrean martyrs and diminishes the principle of self-determination enshrined in international law.

The Legal Gymnastics of Revocation

Horn Review’s essay leans heavily on a supposed principle: that recognition of states is discretionary and revocable.

Yes, in the abstract, recognition is a sovereign act. But once recognition is coupled with UN membership, international treaties, and decades of state practice, it becomes far more than Ethiopia’s to grant or withdraw. Eritrea is recognized by nearly 200 countries and is a full UN member. Ethiopia cannot “unrecognize” it any more than France could unrecognize Algeria in 1970.

The analogies Horn Review trots out collapse under scrutiny.

East Germany disappeared only through reunification with West Germany — not because someone revoked recognition.
Taiwan vs. PRC is a unique case of contested sovereignty with competing claims to the same “China.” Eritrea does not claim Ethiopia, nor does Ethiopia legitimately claim Eritrea.
Somaliland in 1960 is cited as precedent for fluid recognition. Yet Somaliland voluntarily united with Somalia; no one “revoked” its sovereignty from above.

In short, Horn Review cherry-picks examples that bear no resemblance to Eritrea’s situation.

Even more absurd is the suggestion that because Eritrea allegedly fails to meet governance standards, Ethiopia can revoke recognition. By that logic, half the UN — from war-torn states to authoritarian regimes — would cease to exist. Recognition does not hinge on good governance report cards.

International law does not permit Ethiopia to rewrite its history or treat sovereignty like a probationary contract.

Eritrea’s Statehood: Criteria Met

The essay cites the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for statehood — permanent population, defined territory, effective government, capacity for foreign relations — and then insists Eritrea fails on nearly all counts.

Let’s be clear:

Permanent population? Eritrea’s population is resilient, present, and engaged, despite emigration pressures.
Defined territory? Eritrea’s borders are recognized internationally. The only disputes arose because Ethiopia refused to implement the final and binding Algiers Agreement (2002) — in which it agreed to accept the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s ruling.
Effective government? Eritrea’s government controls its entire territory, maintains order, and delivers services under a self-reliant model. It may not conform to Western liberal templates, but effectiveness is not synonymous with electoral cycles.
Foreign relations? Eritrea maintains active bilateral ties across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. Its diplomacy is independent and principled — not beholden to donors or patrons.

Eritrea therefore meets all four criteria. To argue otherwise is polemical, not empirical.

The Fantasy of Ethiopian Revocation

Suppose, for the sake of argument, Ethiopia “withdrew recognition.” What would that mean in practice?

Nothing. Eritrea would remain a UN member, maintain embassies, trade, treaties, and defense partnerships. Ethiopia would only isolate itself further, inviting ridicule for believing sovereignty is a reversible concession.

Worse, such a move would destabilize Ethiopia itself. How can a state battling multiple insurgencies — in Amhara, Oromia, Tigray — claim the moral authority to question Eritrea’s viability? Ethiopia is today closer to fragmentation than Eritrea ever was.

The irony is glaring: a disintegrating federation presuming to lecture its stable neighbor on statehood. Horn Review may not see the humor, but the rest of the region certainly does.

The “Destabilizer” Narrative

The essay paints Eritrea as a perpetual spoiler — aligned with Egypt, meddling in Ethiopia’s insurgencies, undermining stability across the Horn.

This script is familiar. It is the same line Ethiopia’s elites have peddled for two decades to distract from their own failures.

Reality tells a different story:

It was Eritrea that consistently urged Ethiopia to honor the Algiers Agreement and respect international law. Ethiopia refused for nearly 20 years.
It was Eritrea that stayed out of Somalia’s clan wars while Ethiopia repeatedly intervened militarily, often making the situation worse.
It was Eritrea that joined regional mechanisms like IGAD when they were genuinely about cooperation, and distanced itself when they were hijacked as tools of hegemony.
During the Tigray war, Eritrea’s intervention was in support of Ethiopia’s own government, at its request. To now cast Asmara as a destabilizer is selective amnesia.

If stability is the measure, Ethiopia has been the chronic destabilizer in the Horn — from Somalia to South Sudan — while Eritrea has pursued a policy of self-reliance and sovereignty.

Human Rights as Statehood Litmus?

Horn Review’s reliance on reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International is another sleight of hand. Serious human rights concerns exist in many countries. But international recognition is not conditioned on perfection. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Rwanda, or even Ethiopia itself remain recognized despite extensive violations.

To single out Eritrea as “non-state” because of governance style or rights critiques is hypocrisy masquerading as principle.

What This Is Really About: Ethiopia’s Red Sea Obsession

Strip away the legal jargon, and Horn Review’s essay serves one political goal: to revive Ethiopia’s irredentist yearning for the Red Sea.

The Prosperity Party leadership, facing unrest and economic collapse, seeks distractions. What better than to question Eritrea’s independence, dangle the fantasy of “revocation,” and repackage the old dream of reclaiming ports?

This is not policy analysis. It is propaganda by think tank.

Eritrea’s Independence Is Not Up for Debate

Eritrea’s independence was won through blood, sacrifice, and a referendum witnessed by the international community. It was not a gift from Ethiopia, not a favor granted by Meles Zenawi, and certainly not a silver platter offering from the TPLF.

No revisionist essay from Addis Ababa can rewrite that. Recognition is permanent because independence was permanent. The martyrs who fell in Nakfa, Sahel, and Massawa did not give their lives to have their sovereignty treated like a probationary license.

Ethiopia has urgent crises: famine, civil war, fragmentation, economic collapse. That its intellectual class wastes time fantasizing about “revoking Eritrea” is both tragic and absurd.

To borrow Horn Review’s own lofty phrasing: recognition is not immutable? Perhaps not. But Eritrea’s independence is. And that, unlike Ethiopian think tank daydreams, is reality.